The investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice :  Preliminary evidence by Skinner, Douglas J.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (1993) 407-445. North-Holland 
The investment opportunity set and 
accounting procedure choice 
Preliminary evidence* 
Received November 1990. final version received July 1992 
This paper provides evidence on the cross-sectional relation between firms’ investment opportuni- 
ties, their debt and compensation contracts. their size and financial leverage. and their accounting 
procedure choices. This evidence is important. because previous studies hypcthesize !!?ut the link 
between firms’ investment oppor!-unities and their accounting choices helps explain extant results on 
the size. debt/equity. and bonus plan hypotheses. However. while 1 find that firms’ rnvestment 
opportunities do affect the nature of their coIltracts, I also find that the ‘traditional’explanations for 
accounting choice are important after controlling for the effects of the investment opportunity set. 
1. Introduction 
This paper provides evidence on the cross-sectional relation between firms’ 
investment opportunities (hereafter, the investment opportunity set or just the 
‘ios’), the nature of their debt and compensation contracts,’ their size and 
financial leverage, and their accounting procedure choices. The principal 
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empirical conclusions are as follows: 
(1) Consistent with extant research, I find that larger firms are more likely to 
select income-decreasing accounting procedures, that more highly-levered firms 
are more likely to select income-increasing accounting procedures, and that 
firms with accounting-based bonus plans are more likely to select income- 
increasing accounting procedures, than are other firms. Importantly, I also find 
that these relations remain largely unaffected when I include measures of the ios 
in the regressions - the ‘traditional’ explanations are robust to controlling for 
the effect of the ios. 
(2) I document that the ios affects the nature of firms’ debt and compensation 
contracts. Specifically, firms with relatively more assets-in-place are more likely 
to employ (i) accounting-based debt covenants in their public debt contracts and 
(ii) bonus plans that tie the bonus directly to accounting earnings. Thus man- 
agers of firms with more assets-in-place have larger incentives, given the nature 
of the contracts in place in these firms, to select income-increasing accounting 
procedures. This is evidence of an indirect relation between the ios, through its 
effect on contracting, and accounting choice. 
(3) There is limited evidence of a direct association between the ios and 
accounting choice. Specifically, in some accounting choice regressions the ios 
proxy variables have explanatory power with respect to accounting choice over 
and above the traditional variables that proxy for managerial opportunism. 
Although this evidence suggests that the ios affects the ‘accepted set’ of account- 
ing procedures, it should be interpreted cautiously given the correlation that 
exists between the ios and the nature of firm contracts. 
This evidence contributes to the literature on positive accounting theory in 
several ways. First, although there has been speculation in the literature that the 
ios affects accounting procedure choice [Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 199Q)], 
there is little evidence on the relation between the ios and accounting choice. 
The only direct evidence of a relation between the ios and accounting choice (of 
which I am aware) is in Zimmer (1986), who examines whether Australian real 
estate developers capitalize interest costs. The present study is therefore the first 
to provide evidence about the ios/accounting choice relation for a large, ran- 
domly-chosen cross-section of firms. 
Second, most previous studies view accounting choice as a function of 
managers* incentives to behave opportunistically, given contracts in place. [See 
Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) or Watts and Zimmerman (1986, ch. 11) for 
reviews.] These studies typically regress measures of accounting choice on firms’ 
debt-to-equity ratios (to proxy for the incentives that debt contracts provide to 
managers) or on the existence of a bonus plan (to proxy for managers’ incentives 
under those agreements), and interpret the relations they observe as providing 
evidence on the extent to which managerial opportunism drives accounting 
choice. For example, a positive relation between debt-to-equity ratios and 
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the use of income-increasing accounting procedures is usually interpreted as 
evidence in favor of the hypothesis that managers choose income-increasing 
accounting procedures to loosen debt-cr-*nvenant constraints. 
If firms’ investment opportunities systematically affect the types of contracts 
that are written, the inferences that these studies draw cocbld be confounded by 
an omitted variables problem [Watts and Zimmerman (1990)].* To address this, 
I include measures of the ios in accounting choice regressions along with the 
‘traditional’ measures such as firm size, financial leverage, and a bonus plan 
indicator variable. In addition, I collect data on the nature of sample firms’ debt 
and compensation contracts, and report on how the ios affects the nature of 
these contracts across firms. Thus, this paper examines whether the relation 
between the ios, firm contracts, and accounting choice helps explain results 
already in the literature. Alternative explanations are important, for as Leftwich 
(1990, p. 41) emphasizes, ‘even if the existing tests provide unambiguous evi- 
dence of associations in the data, there is little agreement on interpretations of 
those correlations’. 
Finally, this evidence increases our understanding of observed accounting 
practice. For example, firms in the same industry tend to adopt similar account- 
ing practices. Because it is likely to be the case that the nature of investment 
opportunities vary across industries more than they do within industries, the 
ios-accounting choice linkage provides a simple and direct explanation for this 
phenomenon. More generally, the ios-accounting choice linkage helps explain 
why firms’ accounting procedure choices appear to depend on factors such as 
their production and investment, financing, and operating decisions [see, e.g., 
Foster (1986, ch. 5)]. 
To analyze cross-sectional accounting choice data for a large number of firms, 
I have to make simplifying assumptions. For example, I characterize alternative 
accounting procedure choices at a given point in time as either ‘income- 
increasing’ or ‘income-decreasing’ - in practice the earnings effects of particular 
accounting choices tend to reverse over time. (Although with inflation this type 
of reversal will only occur for firms that are shrinking, and so should not 
systematically characterize the firms in my sample.) In addition, managers are 
likely to consider the effect of alternative accounting methods on more than just 
the level of earnings (e.g., under income ‘smoothing’ hypotheses, managers 
attempt to reduce the variability of earnings). While more specific research 
settings avoid such ambiguities [e.g., see Zimmer (1986) J, the results from these 
studies are more difficult to generalize to a broad cross-section of firms. 
Thus, while there are limitations of the evidence that I provide, this evidence 
2Along similar lines, Ball and Foster (1982) and Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) had originally 
criticized these types of accounting choice studies because of the likelihc: ,d that the size, debt/equity, 
and bonus plan proxy variables that they employed are likely to be correlated with many other 
things, including industry membership. 
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nonetheless increases our understanding of extant accounting practice, par- 
ticularly when combined with the evidence from studies that examine smaller 
samples of firms in particular economic circumstances (such as Zimmer’s). 
The next section of the paper summarizes existing theory on the relation 
between the ios and accounting choice, and emphasizes that it is not obvious 
a priori how the ios affects the accepted set of accounting procedures. In 
addition, I provide a rationale for why we expect a relation between the ios and 
the nature of firm contracts, and so why there is also likely to be an indirect link 
between the ios and accounting choice. Section 3 provides details of the sample. 
Section 4 discusses the proxy variables that I use to measure the ios, and 
documents how the ios covaries with firm size, financial leverage, and long-term 
financial performance. Section 5 provides evidence of how the ios affects the 
nature of firms’ bonus plans and debt contracts. Section 6 then provides 
evidence of variation in firms’ accounting choices, and documents how this 
variation is related to variation in these firms’ size, financial leverage, debt and 
compensation contracts, and investment opportunities. Section 7 provides a dis- 
cussion and summary. 
2. The ios-accounting choice linkage 
This section describes two links between the ios and accounting choice. In 
section 2.1 I discuss why we expect to observe a direct relation between the ios 
and the accepted set of accounting procedures. Section 2.2 discusses how the ios 
is likely to affect the nature of firm contracts and thus managers’ incentives to 
select particular accounting procedures after contracts are in place, and so 
provides an indirect link between the ios and observed accounting choice. 
2.1. The ios and the accepied set qf accourzting procedures 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 1990j isolate two principal forces that deter- 
mine firms’ accounting procedure choices. First, certain accounting procedures 
(the ‘accepted set’) evolve through time and emerge as best practice - these are 
the accounting procedures that cost-effectively resolve the firms’ agency prob- 
lems ex ante. This perspective on accounting choice is also known as the 
‘efficient contracting’ perspective [e.g., Holthausen ( 1990)].3 Second, because it 
3An early example of this argument is Watts (1977, p. 61) who draws a linkage between the agency 
costs of debt, the nature of firms’ assets, and the requirement that managers set aside profits for 
‘renewal, repairs, maintenance or depreciation of existing assets’. Leftwich (1983) argues that the 
accounting choices that have evolved as best practice in private lending agreements (as exemplified 
by their existence as ‘boiler-plate’ type provisions) are those procedures that minimize the costs of 
the agency relationship between the firm and its private lenders. Zimmer (1986) provides an example 
in the context of Australian real estate developers of how accounting procedure choices can result 
from contracting solutions that are rx ~tte efficient. 
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is costly to restrict managerial choice entirely, managers choose particular 
accounting procedures from among the accepted set ex post, i.e., after the 
contracts are in place. Managers who do this to make themselves better off at 
the expense of other stakeholders are said to act ‘opportunistically’. The extant 
literature focuses primarily on managers’ incentives to make opportunistic 
choices.4 
In delineating an accepted set of accounting procedures, those appointed to 
monitor the firm’s managers face a tradeoff. On one hand, managers’ accounting 
choices must be restricted to some extent - otherwise contracts denominated in 
accounting nuqsbers are ineffective in restricting manager behavior. For 
example, compensation contracts would do little to motivate managerial per- 
formance if earnings-based management compensation agreements did not 
specify the accounting choices on which the earnings calculation was based. 
On the other hand, however, if there are efficiency-based costs and benefits to 
particular accounting choices, managers are likely to best know which account- 
ing procedure choices maximize the value of the firm. In other words, managers 
are likely to have speci’c knowledge about which accounting choices are optimal 
from the point of view of all claimants. For example, managers are likely to have 
the best information about which accounting procedures minimize the firm’s 
potential costs in the political/regulatory process, or about which accounting 
methods provide the best way of motivating employees (thus ex post choices are 
often efficient as well). Therefore, it is not efficient to contractually restrict 
managerial choice entirely, given this as well as the costs of monitoring and 
enforcing restrictions on accounting choice.5 
The relative costs and benefits of restricting managerial choice are likely to be 
different for different firms. In particular, these costs and benefits - and so the 
eficient ser of accounting procedures - are likely to vary across firms as a func- 
tion of their investment opportunities. For example, Watts and Zimmerman 
(1986, pp. 360-361) argue that the assets of growth firms are more difficult to 
observe because they are primarily represented by future investments. As a re- 
sult, contracts based on these less readily observed values provide managers 
with greater flexibility to behave opportunistically ex post, SO that growth firms’ 
accepted sets of accounting procedures would likely restrict managers’ ability to 
choose income-increasing accounting procedures ex ante. (On the other hand, 
4Choices that are made after contracts are in place are not always the result of managerial 
opportunism - managers also make choices that are KY post efficient from the point of view of the 
firm’s claimants. 
‘In addition to Watts and Zimmerman this general point has previously been made by Demski, 
Patell, and Wolfson (1984) who argue that ‘the delegation to managers of the choice from among the 
set of acceptable (accounting) alternatives can best be understood as efficient, equilibrium behavior’ 
(p. 17) and that ‘by both allowing mangers ‘freedom of choice’ with respect to accounting methods 
and compensating t/tern according/y, owners can capitalize upon managers’ ‘local expertise” (p. 31. 
emphasis in original). 
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the accounting choices that are optimal for growth firms probably depend on 
as-yet unobservable outcomes, so it may be more costly to restrict accounting 
choices in the current period for these firms.) 
While it is clear that the ios will affect both the costs and benefits of writing, 
monitoring, and enforcing contracts, it is difficult to arrive at more specific 
predictions about how exactly the ios will affect the accepted set of accounting 
procedures. As Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 359) note: ‘Development of 
a complex model of the accepted procedure set is difficult since it would involve 
modeling the demand for contracting as a monitoring device and the cost of 
alternative methods of monitoring.’ As a result, I adopt the more modest 
objective of providing descriptive evidence on the relation between the ios and 
observed accounting choicle. 
2.2. The indirect relation between the ios and accounting choice 
In addition to its direct eXects on the accepted set, the ios is likely to affect the 
types of contracts that the firm writes with various claimants. To illustrate this 
in a concrete way, I next analyze how the ios affects the nature of management 
compensation hnd debt contracts, respectively. 
2.2. I. Management compensation agreements 
Management compensation agreements help reduce the conflict of interest 
between corporate managers and stockholders; these plans are designed to 
motivate managers to maximize firm value [Smith and Watts (1982)]. Because 
the costs and benefits of monitoring and motivating managers depend on the 
nature of the firm’s investment opportunities, the structure of management 
compensation agreements will vary across firms as a function of the ios. Smith 
and Watts (1991) argue that the actions of managers of firms with relatively 
more assets-in-place are less costly to monitor than the actions of managers of 
firms whose value is comprised largely of growth opportunities. In addition, 
managers of firms with relatively more growth opportunities are likely to be 
allowed more decision-making discretion because these managers have better 
information about the firm’s investment opportunities than the firm’s stock- 
holders; i.e., managers of growth firms ari: likely to have relatively more specific 
knowledge than managers of firms with relatively more assets-in-place. Conse- 
quently, Smith and Watts predict that growth firms are more likely to use 
incentive compensation schemes that tie management compensation to 
measures of firm performance (such as accounting earnings or stock price). 
In addition, Smith and Watts (1991) argue that accounting numbers are 
poorer performance measures for firms with relatively more growth opportuni- 
ties because of conservatism in accounting: the need for objective and verifiable 
numbers limits the extent to which accountants are willing to recognize income 
that depends on uncertain future events. [Consistent with this, Collins et al. 
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(1992) provide evidence that stock prices lead accounting earnings to a greater 
extent for firms with relatively large amounts of new and intangible assets.] This 
countervailing measurement effect implies that incentive compensation schemes 
that rely on accounting performance measures are less likely to be used in firms 
with growth opportunities, offsetting the arguments above. Stock-based incen- 
tive plans are likely to be more prevalent in growth firms, since these plans 
achieve the incentive-alignment benefits without incurring the accounting 
measurement costs.6 
This discussion is summarized in fig. 1. The figure illustrates the two counter- 
vailing effects of the ios on the nature of managerial compensation - firms 
with more assets-in-place are: (1) less likely to use incentive compensation 
(because their managers optimally have less decision-making discretion) and (2) 
more likely to use accounting earnings numbers in compensation contracts 
(because these numbers are relatively better performance measures in these 
firms). 
Smith and Watts (1991) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) provide evidenc+c that is 
consistent with this. Smith and Watts present industry-level evidence that firms 
with growth opportunities are (i) less likely to use accounting-based bonus plans 
than other firms and (ii) more likely to use stock-option plans. Gaver and Gaver 
(1993) replicate the Smith and Watts analysis for 237 growth firms and 237 
nongrowth firms, and find that their growth firms are more likely to use 
stock-option plans, but no more likely to use earnings-based bonus plans, than 
their nongrowth firms. The fact that the evidence indicates that growth firm: are 
more likely to use stock-option plans, but is inconclusive with respect to which 
firms are more likely to use bonus plans, is consistent with the existence of these 
two opposing effects.’ 
Overall, it is difficult to make a clear a priori prediction about the relation 
between the ios and the use of accounting-based bonus plans because of the two 
countervailing effects, However, the evidence in Smith and Watts (1991) and the 
evidence below (table 3) suggests that, at least as an empirical matter, firms with 
relatively more assets-in-place are more likely to use bonus plans that rely on 
accounting numbers. Consequently, in fig. 1 I indicate that firms with more 
assets-in-place are more likely to employ earnings-based bonus plans. If this is in 
‘Sibson (1990, pp. 342-343) prescribes for ‘fast-growing enterprises’: ‘There is continuous change 
in these firms. Therefore, compensation systems must be simple and highly adaptable to 
change . . . In fast-growing companies, you don’t have annual bonus plans. Performance standards 
would be changing frequently. Also, some plans, like management bonus plans, can be divisive in 
a fast-growth environment.’ 
7See also Clinch (1991) who finds that high-R&D firms are more likely to use stock-option plans 
than low-R&D firms, but that there is no apparent difference in these firms’ propensity to use 
earnings-based bonus plans, and Lambert and Larcker (1987). who find that firms with relatively 
high rates of sales and asset growth place more weight on market returns and less weight on 
accounting numbers in determining managerial compensation than do other firms. 
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Fig. 1. The link between the investment opportunity set, incentive compensation, accounting 
earnings-based bonus plans, and accounting procedure choices. (*The fact that firms with more 
assets-in-place are more likely to use earnings-based bonus plans is an empirical statement based on 
the evidence in this and o:her studies.) 
fact the case in general, and if the contractual terms of bonus plans provide 
managers with incentives to make income-increasing accounting procedure 
choices, then I expect that firms with more assets-in-place are more likely to use 
accounting-based bonus plans, so that their managers are more likely to select 
income-increasing accounting procedures ex post.’ This is shown as the last 
linkage in fig. 1. 
Debt convers-ts are written to reduce the conflict of interest between the 
firm’s stockholders and bondholders [Smith and Warner (1979)]. Smith and 
Warner describe four principal sources of conflict between bondholders and 
stockholders, two of which have implications for the ios-accounting choice 
linkage.’ 
*Unlike the accruals choices that Healy (1985) documents, managers’ accounting procedure 
choices cannot be altered every period depending on where the firm’s accounting income falls 
relative to the upper and lower bounds in bonus plan contracts; it is relatively costly to change 
accounting procedures [see e.g., Sweeney (199l)J Therefore, the relation between the existence of 
bonus plans and managers* accounting procedure choices is likely to depend on whether income- 
increasing procedure choices will, on average over a period of years, increase the managers’ bonus. 
Based on the relatively strong evidence in favor of the “bonus plan’ hypothesis, this is probably the 
case. However, this is ultimately an empirical question and in the tests that follow I provide evidence 
about the relation between the ios and the terms of bonus plans for a subsample of firms with 
available data. 
‘The other two sources of stockholder-bondholder conflict are ‘dividend payment’ (under which 
the stockholders opportunistically reduce the value of the bondholders’ claims by reducing the firm’s 
level of investment to increase the dividend) and ‘claim dilution’ (under which stockholders 
opportunistically dilute the value ofexisting bondholders’claims by issuing more debt of the same or 
higher priority). Neither of these conflicts relates directly to the nature of the firm’s assets, and so 
neither of these conflicts is linked to the firm’s ios. 
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1. The Underinuestment Problem. As discussed above, while firm managers 
have little discretion with respect to the value of assets-in-place, they can readily 
affect the value of growth opportunities. With risky debt outstanding, Myers 
(1977) shows that situations can arise where managers (acting on shareholders’ 
behalf) decide not to undertake these positive net present value investments 
because most of the payoffs go to bondholders. To mitigate this underinvest- 
ment problem, firms generally only issue risky debt that can be supported by 
assets-in-place. The analysis thus predicts that, other things equal, the larger the 
fraction of firm value represented by assets-in-place, the higher the firm’s 
financial leverage. 
2. The Asset-Substitution Problem. Asset substitution occurs when stockhol- 
ders opportunistically substitute higher variance assets for lower variance assets, 
once the debt has been issued. Asset substitution will transfer wealth to the 
stockholders if the debt has been issued and priced on the assumption of 
low-variance assets. The extent to which asset substitution creates agency costs 
will vary across firms as a function of their ios. If a firm’s ios is comprised largely 
of assets-in-place, it is relatively easy to prevent asset substitution - the assets 
are ‘fixed’ assets which are relatively easy for outsiders to monitor (external 
auditors, for example, can easily verify the continued existence and upkeep of 
fixed assets such as land, buildings, plant, and equipment). On the other hand, if 
firm value is largely comprised of intangible growth opportunities, asset substi- 
tution is likely to be more difficult to prevent. Therefore, as with underinvest- 
ment, firms with relatively more growth opportunities are less likely to issue 
risky debt (other things held constant). 
D-+1, I,” Aerinvestment and asset substitution suggest that firms with relatively U”Lll U‘IUI& ___ A 
more assets-in-place will be more highly levered than firms whose va!ue is 
comprised principally of growth opportunities. Gaver and Gaver (1993), Long 
and Malitz (1985), and Smith and Watts (1991) all provide evidence that is 
consistent with this prediction. This relation is shown as the upper part of the 
first linkage in fig. 2. 
If firms whose value is made up principally of growth opportunities are less 
likely to issue debt, these firms are also less likely to have accounting-based debt 
covenants. This follows because: (i) these firms have less debt so that bondhol- 
ders do not require the same degree of protection, (ii) the cost of these restric- 
tions, in terms of inhibiting these firms’ future investment decisions, is likely to 
be larger for these firms, and (iii) as argued above, accounting numbers are likely 
to provide relatively poor information for monitoring stockholders of these 
firms. These relations are shown in fig. 2.” 
“Press and Weintrop (1990) provide evidence that firms that use accounting-based debt cove- 
nants are more highly levered than firms that do not have these constraints. If firms with more 
assets-in-place are also more highly levered, this evidence supports the view that the ios affects the 
likelihood that firms will have accounting-based debt covenants. 
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Fig. 2. The link between the investment opportunity set, financial leverage, accounting-based debt 
covenants, and accounting procedure choices. 
Extant evidence on the debt/equity hypothesis indicates that larger 
debt/equity ratios are associated with the use of income-increasing accounting 
procedures, and suggests that managers choose income-increasing accounting 
procedures to loosen debt-covenants constraints. However, if the ios affects both 
financial leverage and the extent to which firms utilize accounting-based debt 
covenants, these studies potentially suffer from a correlated omitted variables 
problem. 
It is difficult to discriminate between these explanations empirically: is it 
opportunism that explains the observed relation between accounting choice and 
leverage, or is it that the ios determines both leverage and the firm’s accounting 
choices?’ ’ Press and Weintrop (1990) provide evidence that, even after control- 
ling for managers’ incentives under accounting-based debt covenants, leverage is 
still significant in explaining cross-sectional variation in accounting choice. As 
they note, one expianation for this result is that leverage is proxying for the ios in 
these regressions. By including ios measures directly in these regressions, the 
tests in this paper provide evidence on whether or not this is true, and, more 
generally, on the extent to which the ios determines accounting choice condi- 
tional on the incentives that managers have under contracts in place. 
2.2.3. Summary 
I have argued that the ios affects the accounting procedures used by firms 
indirectly. This occurs because the ios affects the nature of the contracts written 
“In section 2.2.1, the opportunism to which I was referring involved wealth transfers from the 
firm to its managers under managerial compensation contracts. In this section, I am referring to 
opportunism under debt agreements that involves wealth transfers from bondholders to stockhol- 
ders that are implemented by managers (who are, following Smith and Warner, assumed to act in the 
best ir,:eres& of the stockholders). In both cases managers choose income-increasing accounting 
procedures .I effect the wealth trpn$ers. 
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between the firm and its stakeholders, and because - other things equal - the 
nature of these contracts, in turn, affects the accounting procedures that man- 
agers select ex post. The ceteris paribus assumption here is important, because 
the effects of the ios on the accepted set of accounting procedures may offset 
managers’ opportunistic incentives (this is an empirical question). For example, 
if firms with relatively more assets-in-place are more likely to use earnings-based 
bonus plans, so that managers of these firms have larger incentives to make 
income-increasing accounting choices cx post, it may also be that these firms’ 
accepted sets of accounting procedures are more likely to restrict managers’ 
ability to make these choices ex ante. 
3. Sample selection 
To obtain a broad cross-section of firms I select all firms on the 1989 
Compustat II PST jik (Compustat) that have the requisite data available. To 
focus primarily on unregulated industrial firms, I exclude firms in the following 
four-digit SIC categories: (i) 100-1400 (mining firms), (ii) 2911 (petroleum firms), 
(iii) 4011 (railroads), (iv) 4911-4991 (utilities), (v) 6021-8744 (financial, medical, 
and service firms). Many of these firms do not report depreciation or inventory 
accounting choices (because they do not have material depreciable assets and/or 
inventories), which are my primary interest here.12 
Table 1 lists the number of firms selected in each two-digit SIC code industry, 
along with the number of firms available for selection in each industry. The 
data-collection constraint is the availability of these firms’ accounting procedure 
choices (financial and stock market data being relatively cheaply available on 
Compustut and CRSP). I obtain these data from firms’ annual reports, primarily 
from the first footnote where firms generally disclose their ‘summary of signifi- 
cant accounting policies’. The firms in the sample are those that are incorpor- 
ated in the United States, have 1987 annual reports available in the University of 
Michigan Kresge Duallavuu _ **-;-cc 4dministration Library, and disclose their accounting 
procedure choices. l3 The sample comprises 78% of the relevant population of 
Compustut firms (504 of the 650 available firms). The coverage varies by industry 
from a minimum of 60.8% (steel firms) to a maximum of 100% (several industries). 
“Although mining and petroleum firms have both fixed asset: and inventories, they tend to 
account for these assets in unique ways. and so are excluded from !he sa:nple. For example. because 
mining firms often recognize revenue at the point of production, their inventories die usually 
recorded at amounts that exceed cost, i.e., at market value. And both mining and petroleum firms 
typically use some type of depletion base to allocate the cost of their fixed assets to expense, making 
it difficult to compare their depreciation methods directly to those of other industrial firms 
(moreover, for many of these firms the important choice is between full cost and successful efforts 
accounting, not between straight-line and accelerated depreciation). 
“Consistent with Can~pustat, I define a 1987 annual report as one for the year ended over the 
6/30/87 to 5131188 period. 
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Table 1 
Summary of SIC-defined industry representation of 504 sample firms with available data in 1987. 





Heavy Construction 1600- 1799 10 12 
Food Products 2000-2070 34 47 
Textile Mills 2200-222 1 13 17 
Finished Apparel 2300-2330 18 25 
Millwork, etc. 2421-2451 11 14 
Furniture 2510-2522 12 15 
Paper Products 2600-263 1 22 23 
Newspaper Publishing 2711 11 13 
Periodicals, Books 2721-2731 6 6 
Chemicals 2800-2829 24 33 
Drugs, Pharmaceuticals 2834 27 39 
Plastics 3080- 3089 15 18 
Footwear 3140 10 10 
Cement 3241-3270 11 II 
Blast Furnaces (Steel) 3312 14 23 
Nonferrous Metals 3330-3334 11 14 
Metal Tools, Parts, etc. 341 f-3460 33 40 
Machinery 3510-3537 20 ?2 
Computing Equipment 3570-3571 19 23 
Electrical Machinery 3600-362 I 14 19 
Semiconductors 3674 14 15 
Motor Vehicles 3711 7 10 
Aircraft/Aerospace 3721-3760 28 32 
Instruments & Controls 3812-3861 51 75 
Air Transport 4512 10 15 
Radio & TV Broadcasting 4833 6 7 
Retail - Dept. Stores 531 l-5331 20 26 
Retail - Grocery 5411 9 13 
Retail - Apparel 5651 6 6 
Retail - Fast Food 5812 18 27 
Total firms 504 650 
“The number of firms in a given industry group in the final sample. This represents those firms in 
the population (see footnote b below) that are incorporated in the United States, have 1987 annual 
reports on tile at the Universi!y of Michigan Kresge Business Administration Library, and that 
disclose their accounting choices. 
bThe ‘populatio n‘ 
industria! tape. 
represents all firms in a given industry group on the 1989 annual C’ompustot 
4. Size, leverage, and investment opportunity set proxy variables 
4.1. The meusures 
The accounting procedure choices that I seek to explain are those reported at 
fiscal year-end 1987. Therefore, the financial variables are measured for each 
firm as the average of the year-end values for 1985 through 1987. The data are 
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taken from annual Compustat. 1 discuss measures of each of the constructs 
separately. 
4.1. i. investment opportunity* set measures 
The construct that I seek to measure here is Myers’ (1977) notion of assets- 
in-place vs. growth opportunities. I use three variables to capture this construct. 
In addition to these three variables, I include a measure of the riskiness of these 
firms’ assets. 
First, to measure assets-in-place (i.e., those assets whose ultimate value does 
not principally depend on future discretionary investment by managers), I calcu- 
late the ratio of the book value of gross property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) 
to the value of the firm. The intuition behind this measure is that past invest- 
ments in property, plant, and equipment can be characterized as assets-in-place. 
This measure is increasing in the proportion of assets-in-place to value. 
Second, as an additional proxy for growth opportunities vs. assets-in-place, 
I use the firm’s research and development (R&D) expense deflated by net sales. 
The rationale here is that investments in R&D yield expected payoffs that form 
part of managers’ private information and that the value of these investments is 
difficult for outsiders to measure reliably. Moreover, R&D expenditures com- 
prise, at least to some extent, discretionary expenditures and so are like the 
growth options that Myers describes [Dechow and Sloan (1991)]. Long and 
Malitz (1985) and Smith and Watts (1991) also use R&D expenditures to 
measure Myers’ notion of growth opportunities. 
Finally, I also include Tobin’s 4 ratio, which is defined as the market value of 
the firm divided by the replacement cost of its assets. This variable increases with 
the proportion of firm value represented by intangible assets. Both Lindenberg 
and Ross (1981) and Merck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) provide arguments 
and/or evidence that Tobin’s 4 increases with the proportion of value repre- 
sented by intangibles [in fact Merck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988, p. 299) use 
R&D and advertising variables to control for ‘observable measures of intangible 
assets that affect $1. 
Following Lindenberg and Ross (1981), I estimate the replacement cost of 
these firms’ assets as the sum of the replacement cost of property, plant, and 
equipment (PP&E), the replacement cost of inventories (measured as the book 
value of inventories plus the LIFO reserve), and the book value of other assets. 
I estimate the replacement cost of PP&E using the procedure outlined by Hall et 
al. (1988) for the NBER R&D master file data: 
1. Estimate the average age of the PP&E by dividing 1987 year-end accumu- 
lated depreciation by the 1987 depreciation expense (this assumes straight-line 
depreciation). 
2. Multiply the 1987 net book value of PP&E by ihc ratio of the GNP 
deflator for fixed nonresidential investment in 1987 to this same deflator AA 
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years before 1987, where AA is the average age of the assets from 1. [This 
assumes that the replacement cost of PP&E grows, on average, at the same rate 
as the GNP deflator for fixed nonresidential investment. Hall et al. (1988) and 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) use the GNP deflator for fixed nonresidential 
investment in similar calculations.] 
I then divide the market value of the firm (i.e., the size measure described 
below) by this estimate of the replacement cost of the assets to yield an estimate 
of q. 
To proxy for the risk of these firms’ investment opportunities, I estimate their 
asset betas. To calculate an asset beta, I first estimate the beta of each firm’s 
stock, and then ‘unlever’ this number by multiplying by the equity-to-value ratio 
discussed below [see Hamada (1972)]. This estimation procedure assumes that 
the firm’s debt is approximately risk-free.14 
To summarize, I use four variables to characterize the ios for these firms: one 
measure that is positively related to assets-in-place/firm value (gross PP&E- 
to-value), two measures that are positively related to growth opportunities/firm 
value (R&D-to-sales and q), and a measure of risk (asset beta). 
4.1.2. Firm size and financial leverage 
I measure the size of the firm as the sum of the market value of equity and the 
book value of debt (current liabilities plus long-term debt). Two measures of 
financial leverage are employed, one based on book values and the other on 
market values. The book value measure is the ratio of the book value of 
long-term debt to the book value of total assets (debt-to-assets), while the 
market value measure is the ratio of the market value of equity to firm size, 
calculated as described above (equity-to-value). The debt-to-assets measure is 
increasing and the equity-to-value measure is decreasing in financial leverage. 
4.1.3. Accounting ROA 
Firms’ past accounting performance is used since there is reason to believe 
that accounting procedure choice is related to how well or badly firms are 
performing: firms that are poor performers are more likely to select income- 
increasing accounting procedures [see, for example, Lilien, Mellman, and Pas- 
tena (1988) and Sweeney (1991)]. It is important to control for accounting 
14The betas are estimated for most (305) firms using five years of monthly CRSP data through 
December 1987. Some firms are not available on the CRSP monthly returns files, however, and so 
for these firms (134) I use 500 days of daily return data from the CRSP daily returns file. I thus have 
beta estimates for a total of 439 sample firms. I use montly beta estimates where available because 
these are less susceptible to the measurement error that arises because of nonsynchronous trading 
than are daily beta estimates. 
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performance because, for example, firms’ recent accounting performance may 
be correlated with their ios: firms for which assets-in-place comprise a large 
fraction of value may have performed systematically better (or worse) than 
other firms. The particular measure that I use here is an average (over the 
last ten years) annual accounting return on assets (ROA), calculated in each 
year as operating income (before amortization and depreciation and adjusted 
for changes in the LIFO reserve) divided by the market value of the firm 
in that year. l5 I measure performance over a ten-year period because the 
evidence in Sweeney (1991) indicates that managers’ accounting procedure 
choices are a function of firms’ long-term but not short-term earnings perform- 
ance, which is consistent with there being relatively large costs of changing 
accounting procedures. I subtract the change in the LIFO reserve to remove 
the effect of inventory method choice from the accounting rate of return 
variable. 
A limitation of ROA is that because I measure performance over such a long 
window, it may proxy for expected accounting returns as much as for poor 
earnings realizations. Moreover, the ten-year average may not be a good proxy 
for the relatively short periods of poor performance within this window that 
could cause managers to switch to income-increasing accounting procedures. As 
a result, I treat this variable as an (albeit noisy) control for both poor perform- 
ance and expected returns, an approach that is justifiable on the grounds that it 
is the other variables (the ios, size, and leverage) that are of primary economic 
interest. 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides cross-sectional rank correlations for the independent vari- 
ables described above. I report rank correlations because the distributions of 
several variables are skewed. 
The two financial leverage variables are inversely related (correlation - 0.63), 
which is expected if both variables measure financial leverage. The ios variables 
are also correlated, providing assurance that they are capturing the same 
underlying construct. Asset beta is negatively related to the assets-in-place 
measure ( - 0.24 with gross PP&E-to-value) and positively related to the R&D 
variable (0.29) and q (0.40). Thus, firms with relatively more growth opportuni- 
ties (and so relatively few assets-in-place) tend to have more systematic asset 
risk. Gross PP&E-to-value is negatively related to the R&D measure ( - 0.10) 
and to q ( - 0.61). These correlations are all statistically significant and in the 
‘correct’ direction for these variables to be measuring assets-in-place vs. growth 
I51 have also calculated ROA by adding back interest expense in addition to these other 
a.djustments, with similar results to those that I report below. 
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Table 2 
Sp;arman rank correlations for fiscal 1987 between the size, profitability, financial leverage, and 
investment opportunity set measures of 504 sample firms.“. b 
_~~~_~~ _~~~ - ~~~~~~ - .-~ ~- --- 
Financial leverage Investment opportunity set variables 
_..._~~_~_ _~ .-- ~~ ~~ ~~~~ _~ ~_~ ~~~ 
Accg Debt/ MVE,’ Asset PPE/ R&D/ Tobin’s 
ROA assets value beta value sales 4 
Size: 
Value 0.25’ - 0.02 0.17’ 0.41’ 0.01 
Projitahiliry 
Accg ROA - 0.02 0.21’ 0.14’ 0.25’ 
Financial lererage: 
Debt/assets - 0.63’ - 0.32’ 0.21’ 
MVE,‘value 0.62’ - 0.38’ 
lnresrment opportunit_v cariohles: 




- 0.1 Id - 0.04 
- 0.24’ - 0.19’ 
0.22’ 0.56’ 
0.29’ 0.40’ 
- O.lOd - 0.61’ 
0.22’ 
“The numbers in the table are Spearman rank correlation coefficients, calculated using firm level 
data. There are 504 firms, although the correlations are typically calculated with fewer observations 
since most firms have missing data for at least one variable. 
bThe variables are defined as follows. All variables (except asset beta, accounting ROA. and 
Tobin’s q) are calculated for each firm as the average over year-end 1985 through year-end 1987, and 
so are based on three observations for each firm. 
Firm value = 
Accg ROA : 
Debt/assets = 
MVE/value = 
Asset beta = 
PPE/value = 
market value of the firm (in millions of dollars) 
market value of equity plus book value of debt; 
ten-year average of the yearly ratio of operating income (before depreciation 
expense and after adjusting for the change in the LIFO reserve) to firm value, 
expressed as a percentage: 
book-value of long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets; 
market value of equity divided by the market value of the firm; 
beta of the firm’s stock multiplied by the MVE!value ratio; 
gross property, plant, and equipment (at historic cost) divided by the market value 
of the firm: 
R&D/sales = research and development expense divided by net sales, expressed as a percentage; 
Tobin’s q = estimate of Tobin’s q ratio (see text for details of calculations). 
‘Significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level, two-tailed test. 
dSiunificantly different from zero at the 0.05 level, two-tailed test. P 
opportunities. Finally, y is positively related to the R&D (0.22) measure, consis- 
tent with q measuring firms’ intangible investment opportunities.16 
There is also evidence of an association between these firms’ investment 
opportunities and their financial leverage. In particular, financial leverage is 
“1 also performed a factor analysis to try and gauge how many underlying or ‘latent’ variables the 
four ios variables were capturing. The factor analysis reveals that a single factor explains 49% of the 
cross-sectional variation in these four variables, and that two factors together explain 73% of the 
variation. Moreover, when 1 cxcludc the risk measure, a single factor explains 55% of the variation 
in the remaining three variables. This evidence is consistent with these variables capturing two 
underlying investmcnl opportunity constructs: the assets-in-place vs. growth options dimension, as 
well as the fact that asset risk varies as a function of the ios. 
positively related to the proportion of assets that comprise assets-in-place: the 
equity-to-value measure, for example, is negatively related to gross PPE-to- 
value ( - 0.38) and positively related to R&D/sales (0.22) and 4 (0.56). These 
correlations are consistent with Myers’ prediction: firms with more assets- 
in-place are, on average, more highly levered than other firms. In addition, the 
correlation between asset beta and equity-to-value is 0.62; so there is a negative 
relation between leverage and systematic asset risk. This is to be expected if firms 
with more growth opportunities are also more risky (i.e., because growth 
opportunities represent more risky investment opportunities than assets-in- 
place, they also support less debt). Overall, the evidence confirms that financial 
leverage is related to the nature of firms’ investment opportunities, which 
supports the view that some of the extant evidence on the debt/equity hypothesis 
could be confounded by an omitted variables problem.17 
Firm size is related to three of the four ios measures. Size is positively related 
to systematic asset risk (0.41), R&D/sales (0.19), and 4 (0.18). The accounting 
ROA variable is positively related to asset beta (0.14) and negatively related to 
market-valued leverage (0.2 1 with equity-to-value). 
5. The relation between the investment opportunity set and firm contracts 
This section provides evidence on the relation between the ios and nature of 
sample fi*?ms management compensation plans and debt contracts. This linkage 
is important because the arguments in section 2 suggest that the ios affects 
accounting choice indirectly through its effects on the nature of firms’ contracts. 
I collect information on these firms’ bonus plans on two levels of detail.‘* 
First, to investigate whether there is a relation between the parameters of these 
plans [such as the lower and upper bounds that Healy (1985) describes] and the 
ios, I collect all available plan details for a subsample of 100 sample firms. 
Second, consistent with previous studies, I also collect information on whether 
or not firms in the full sample had a bonus plan under which the bonus award 
explicitly dep=- ~$5 Oii accounting earnings. 
Larger firms are more likely to disclose bonus plan details in their proxy 
statements than are smaller firms [see Healy (1985), Kim and Schroeder (199O)J. 
To maximize the chances of obtaining bonus plan details, I collect all available 
bonus plan information for the 100 !argest sample firms from the proxy 
“See Bradley, Jarrell. and Kim (1984). Gaver and Caver (1993). Long and Mak f 1985). and 
Smith and Watts (1991) for similar evidence. 
“Following Heidy (1085) and other subsequent slttdics I restrict attetiiion to firms’ annual bonus 
PliltIS. 
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statements that these firms filed over the 1981 through 1990 period. (By selecting 
only the largest firms I weaken the power of these tests if, as the correlations in 
table 2 suggest, size is correlated with the ios: by choosing large firms I tend to 
select firms with relatively more assets-in-place than characterizes the sample as 
a whole.) I chose the ten-year sampling interval because previous studies report 
that bonus plans are subject to shareholder approval every three, five, or ten 
years, at which time details of the plans are usually available in the proxy 
statement [e.g., see Healy (1985)]. 
Of these 100 firms, 9 appear not to have a bonus plan, 6 disclose the existence 
of a plan but provide no information about how awards are determined under 
the plan, 44 have a ‘discretionary’ bonus plan (under which the bonus award is 
made at the discretion of the compensation committee of the board of directors), 
and 41 have ‘incentive’ bonus plans that explicitly tie the bonus to an accounting 
earnings measure (return on equity, operating earnings, net income before taxes, 
extraordinary items, etc.). l9 These proportions are comparable to those in Healy 
(1985). Healy starts with the Fortune 250, and finds that around half of these 
firms (123) have bonus plans but do not publicly disclose bonus plan details, and 
ultimately arrives at a sample of 94 firms with bonus plans that tie the bonus to 
accounting earnings. These proportions are similar to mine because a large 
number of firms in the former group probably have ‘discretionary’ bonus plans 
that Healy excludes. 
To investigate whether there is a relation between the ios and the nature of 
firms’ bonus plans, table 3 compares the size, leverage, profitability, and ios 
measures for those firms: (i) with incentive bonus plans (41 firms), (ii) with 
discretionary bonus plans (44 firms), and (iii) without any bonus plans (9 firms). 
If the arguments in section 2 are correct, accounting earnings should be 
relatively better performance measures in firms with more assets-in-place. 
“The terms ‘incentive’ and ‘discretionary’ bonus plans are from Sibson (1990, ch. 18). Although 
a detailed examination of this issue is best left for further research, my reading of the available details 
of these 85 bonus plans indicates clearly that two distinct types of plan exist, where one type 
(‘discretionary’) ostensibly provides boards with much more discretion than the other. More 
specifically, incentive bonus plans typically specify - with accounting e;mings numbers - the upper 
and lower bounds, and then give the compensation committee discretion to decide on the bonus 
within these bounds. For example, the General Motors Bonus Plan provides for a transfer to the 
reserve of 8% of net earnings in excess of $I billion, provided that amount does not exceed the total 
amount of the common stock dividend for the year. In contrast, discretionary plans provide the 
compensation committee with almost complete discretion with respect to the bonus. For example, 
Union Carbide’s 1989 proxy statement, in describing the bonus plan, states that ‘the bonuses, if any, 
for 1988 will be determined by the Committee. . . on the basis of the Committee’s evaluation of 
factors such as the Corporation’s financial results . . . , 
and . . . 
the performance of the officers individually 
as a group, and the levels of salaries and bonuses paid by competitive employers. The 
Committee has the right, in its sole discretion, to increase, decrease, or eliminate the bonus 
the basis of the Committee’s review’ (Union Carbide proxy statement dated March 17. 1988,‘~.‘2~ 
The existence of such a dichotomy makes sense if accounting earnings are better measures of firm 
performance in some firms than they are in others, as 1 argue below. 
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Table 3 
Comparison of average (median) size, leverage, and investment opportunity set measures for 94 
sample firms: (i) with an accouniing-earnings-based ‘incentive’ bonus plan. (ii) with a ‘discretionary’ 
bonus plan that is not explicitly tied to accounting earnings, and (iii) without any type of bonus plan, 
in fiscal 1987.” 
Firms without 
a bonus plan 
(9) 


















MVE/value 0.717 0.648 
(0.809) (0.680) 
Projtability: 




Investment opportunity variables: 
































“The variables are defined as follows. All variables (except asset beta, accounting ROA, and 
Tobin’s q) are calculated for each firm as the average over year-end 1985 through year-end 1987, and 





Asset beta = 
PPE/value = 
market value of the firm (in millions of dollars) 
market value of equity plus book value of debt; 
book-value of long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets; 
market value of equity divided by the market value of the firm; 
beta of the firm’s stock multiplied by the MVE/value ratio; 
gross property, plant, and equipment (at historic cost) divided by the market value 
of the firm; 
R&D/sales = research and development expense divided by net sales, expressed as a percentage; 
Tobin’s q = estimate of Tobin’s q ratio (see text for details of calculations). 
bStatistically significant difference between the number in this column and the corresponding 
number for firms with an ‘incentive’ bonus plan at the 10% level under two-tailed, two-sample f-tests 
(Wilcoxon tests). 
‘Statistically significant difference between the number in this column and the corresponding 
number for firms with an ‘incentive’ bonus plan at the 5% level under two-tailed, two-sample r-tests 
(Wilcoxon tests). 
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Consequently, these firms are likely to use incentive bonus plans that tie the 
bonus directly to accounting earnings while firms with more growth opportuni- 
ties are likely to use discretionary bonus plans that do not. 
The evidence in table 3 is consistent with this. Firms that use incentive 
bonus plans have higher mean and median gross PP&E to value ratios 
(more assets-in-place) but smaller q and R&D ratios (fewer growth opportu- 
nities) than firms that use discretionary bonus plans, although only the differ- 
ence in mean and median R&D ratios is statistically significant. Moreover, 
firms without any bonus plans appear to be those with the largest proportion 
of growth opportunities of all of the three groups, which is also consistent 
with accounting numbers being poorer performance measures in growth 
firms. 
The evidence in table 3 provides some support for the idea that the ios affects 
the firm’s choice of bonus plan (i.e., incentive vs. discretionary) such that firms 
with relatively more assets-in-place are more likely to use incentive bonus plans. 
If this is the case in general and other things are held the same, managers of these 
firms are likely to have larger incentives to choose income-increasing accounting 
procedures, implying an indirect link between the ios and accounting choice. 
This is examined further in section 6. 
For those firms with an incentive bonus plan that ties the bonus to an 
accounting earnings measure (41 firms), I also examine whether there is a rela- 
tion between how the parameters in these firms’ plans are set and their leverage 
and ios measures. Of these 41 firms, 26 disclosed details of a lower bound and 16 
disclosed details of an upper bound. The tests (not reported in tables) indicate 
that there is no apparent relation between these bounds and the ios or leverage 
of these firms. However, this is not too surprising since: (i) the results in table 
3 indicate that firms with incentive bonus plans tend to be those with relatively 
large amounts of assets-in-place, so there is not much variation in the ios of the 
firms that disclose details of the upper and lower bounds, and (ii) the sample 
sizes are small. 
5.2. The ios and accounting-based debt conuenunts 
I collect data on sample firms’ accounting-based debt convenants from 
Moody’s Industrial Marum (1987). Begley (1990b) indicates that Moody’s pro- 
vides reasonably complete data on accounting-based debt covenants in firms’ 
public but not private debt issues. As a result of this, I can only make inferences 
about the relation between the ios and accounting-based debt covenants in 
public debt issues. This limitation will be important if there is any systematic 
relation between the ios and firms’ relative utilization of public vs. private debt, 
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as seems likely. 2o Following Duke and Hunt (1990) and Press and Weintrop 
(1990), I collect information on the existence of nine specific types of accounting- 
based covenants, although these nine covenants can be classified into the four 
broad groups that both of these papers use: leverage restrictions, working 
capital restrictions, net asset restrictions, and retained earnings restrictions. 
Of the 504 sample firms, I am able to identify 465 in Moody’s. Of these firms, 
259 (56%) have at least one accounting-based debt covenant, while the remain- 
ing 206 do not. To examine the relation between accounting-based debt cove- 
nants, financial leverage, and the ios, table 4 provides a comparison of the firms 
with at least one accounting-based debt covenant to the firms without an 
accounting-based debt covenant. 21 There are two principal results in the table. 
First, consistent with the evidence in Begley (1990a) and Duke and Hunt (1990), 
firms with accounting-based debt covenants have more debt than other firms. 
The average (median) debt-to-assets ratio for the firms with at least one account- 
ing-based debt covenant is 0.25 (0.23) compared to an average (median) of 0.16 
(0.14) for the firms with no accounting-based debt covenants. These differences 
are significant at the 1% level. Similar differences exist for the equity-to-value 
leverage measure. Thus, firms with more debt are more likely to use accounting- 
based debt covenants in public debt agreements, as argued in section 2. 
Second, there are also reliable differences between the ios measures for firms 
with and without accounting-based debt covenants. On average, the firms with 
accounting-based debt covenants in their public debt agreements have lower 
asset betas (0.59 vs. 0.67), higher gross PP&E ratios (0.59 vs. 0.51), and smaller 
R&D (0.018 vs. 0.028) and q (1.09 vs. 1.29) ratios than the firms without 
accounting-based covenants. Differences between the medians are of similar 
magnitude, and all of these differences are statistically significant at the 5% level 
for two-tailed, two-sample t and Wilcoxon tests. This evidence is consistent with 
the prediction from section 2 that firms with more assets-in-place have more 
debt, and so are more likely to use accounting-based debt covenants than other 
firms [although again, this relation holds only for public debt - growth firms 
2DAs discussed earlier, it is likely that managers in growth firms have more specific knowledge 
about their firms’ assets and that the value of these growth opportunities is less observable. There is 
therefore likely to be a relatively large informational asymmetry between managers in growth firms 
and outsiders, especially if part of asset value comprises information that is proprietary. If this is so, 
then these firms may favor the use of private debt over public debt for two reasons. First, contracting 
and negotiation costs will be lower, because it is probably easier to convince a few relatively 
sophisticated lenders of the value of their firms’ assets. Second, it is less likely that the proprietary 
information will end up in the public domain if the firm negotiates with private lenders. 
210f the firms with at least one accounting-based convenant, 69 had one covenant, 90 had two 
covenants, 83 had three covenants, 14 had four covenants, and 3 had five covenants. When 
I calculate the rank correlations between the number of accounting-based covenants and the 
leverage and ios measures, I obtain similar inferences to those described in the text. That is, there is 
a positive relation between the number of accounting-based debt covena?& financial leverage. and 
assets-in-place. 
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Table 4 
Comparison of average (median) size, leverage, and investment opportunity set measures for 465 
firms with and without at least one accounting-based debt covenant in their public debt agreements 














Accounting ROA 0.119 
(0.123) 
Investment opportunity variables: 































t = 2.84* 
z = 0.21 
t = - 6.22* 
Z = - 6.71* 
t = 7.51* 
Z = 6.99d 
t = 0.22 
z = 0.43 
t = 2.71* 
Z = 2.47* 
t = - 1.95’ 
Z = - 3.46* 
t = 2.95d 
Z = 2.37d 
t = 3.29d 
z = 3.43* 
“The numbers in the difference column are test statistics from two-sample t-tests (Wilcoxon tests) 
of the null hypothesis that the average (median) difference between the two groups of firms is zero. 
bThe variables are defined as follows. All variables (except asset beta, accounting ROA, and 
Tobin’s q) are calculated for each firm as the average over year-end 1985 through year-end 1987, and 
so are based on three observations for each firm. 
Value = market value of the firm (in millions of dollars) 
Debt/assets 1 
market value of equity plus book value of debt; 
book value of long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets; 
MVE/value = market value of equity divided by the market value of the firm; 
Asset beta = beta of the firm’s stock multiplied by the MVE/value ratio; 
PPE/value = gross property, plant, and equipment (at historic cost) divided by the market value 
of the firm; 
R&D/sales = research and development expense divided by net sales, expressed as a percentage; 
Tobin’s q = estimate of Tobin’s q ratio (see text for details of calculations). 
‘Statistical significance at the 5% level (two-tailed test). 
*Statistical significance at the I % level (two-tailed test). 
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may use more private debt which also uses accounting-based debt covenants 
- see Leftwich (1983) 3. Thus, the evidence suggests that the ios drives both 
financiai leverage and the nature of debt coniracts, which implies that there is 
likely to be an indirect link between the ios and accounting choice, as outlined in 
section 2. I address this directly next. 
6. The relation between accounting procedure choices and size, leverage, 
and the investment opportunity set 
6.1. The accounting procedure choices 
This section provides evidence on the determinants of three accounting 
procedure choices: inventory cost flow assumption, depreciation method, and 
goodwill amortization period. To aggregate these choices across firms, I develop 
a scale (from 0 to 2) to measure the extent to which a given accounting 
choice can be characterized as income-increasing. Specifically, I characterize 
the choice of first-in-first-out (FIFO) inventory cost flow assumption, of 
straight-line depreciation, and of a 40-year goodwill amortization period 
(the maximum) as income-increasing; these choices are assigned a score of 2. 
Conversely, the use of a last-in-first-out (LIFO) cost flow assumption, acceler- 
ated depreciation, and a goodwill amortization period of less than 30 years 
are characterized as income-decreasing and assigned a score of 0. Finally, 
the average cost method for inventory (or an approximately equal-weighted 
combination of FIFO and LIFO), units-of-production depreciation (or a 
combination of straight-line and accelerated methods), and a goodwill amorti- 
zation period of between 30 and 39 years (or a statement that goodwill is 
amortized over periods ‘not to exceed 40 years’) are characterized as neither 
income-increasing nor income-decreasing, and so receive a score of 1. Therefore, 
for each of the three procedure choices, the score increases from 0 for the most 
‘income-decreasing’ technique through to 2 for the most ‘income-increasing’ 
technique.22 
The characterization of accounting techniques as ‘income-increasing’ or ‘in- 
come-decreasing’ is a simplification. The choice of particular accounting tech- 
niques is a choice that determines how revenues and expenses are allocated to 
different accounting periods rather than a choice that affects the total amount of 
income that is recognized. However, without access to additional information it 
is difficult to improve on the above categorization. Moreover, since previous 
studies also adopt this categorization scheme [e.g., Hagerman and Zmijewski 
(1979), Zmijewski and Hagerman (198 I), Dhaliwal, Salamon, and Smith (1983, 
221 alsa use finer partition where suffkient detail is provided in the annual report. For example, if 
a firm states that it uses a combination oT the FIFO and AC’ methods, I code this choice as 1.5. 
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Sweeney (1991)], my results will be directly comparable to those already in the 
literature. 
Another difficulty with the way that I characterize these firms’ accounting 
choices is that it ignores the higher moments of the earnings effects of different 
accounting methods. For example, LIFO will often increase the variability of 
firm earnings vis-a-vis FIFO. This may be at least as important to risk-averse 
managers as the effect of inventory method on the level of earnings, especially 
since the levels effects tend to be offsetting over time. Once again, however, it is 
difficult to do a great deal about this without performing a much more detailed 
time series analysis that considers more precisely the effects of alternative 
accounting methods on the variance of individual firm earnings. 
Table 5 provides a summary of these firms’ accounting choices. With respect 
to inventory accounting, the majority (38%) of firms choose LIFO, while 32.5% 
choose FIFO, and 20.7% make an intermediate choice. The proportion of firms 
using LIFO is comparable to that in Accounting Trends and Techniques 1988 
(ATT) of 40%. The depreciation method choice shows less variation, with 
74. I % of the sample choosing straight-line depreciation, 14.9% choosing either 
units-of-production or an intermediate combination, and only 9.6% choosing 
accelerated depreciation. 23 The fact that 74% of firms make the income- 
increasing depreciation choice, while only 32% of firms’ choose the income- 
increasing inventory method suggests that different forces drive these two 
accounting choices; in particular, the inventory choice likely reflects tax-mini- 
mization as well as financial reporting incentives. Nevertheless, the depreciation 
and inventory choices exhibit a small positive correlation of 0.10 (significant at 
the 5% level). Finally, of the 231 firms that report a goodwill accounting 
method, around half (48%) make the income-increasing choice, 40.7% make an 
intermediate choice, leaving 11.3% that choose a relatively small amortization 
period. The goodwill choice exhibits a small positive correlation with the 
depreciation choice (correlation of 0.10) but is uncorrelated with the inventory 
choice (correlation of 0.02). 
The next subsection provides evidence on the determinants of these firms’ 
inventory, depreciation, and goodwill choices. I analyze these choices separately 
because the relatively small correlations among them indicates that: (i) different 
forces drive the different accounting choices (e.g., tax considerations affect firms’ 
inventory accounting choices but not their depreciation or goodwill choices), 
and/or (ii) the noise added by categorizing particular choices as income-increas- 
ing or income-decreasing (see above) limits my ability to aggregate these scores 
across the three different accounting choices. 
230f the 600 firms in the ATT sample, 559 use straight-line depreciation, 132 use accelerated 
methods, and 51 use units of production (clearly, a number of firms use more than one mclhod). 
Similarly, of the 213 firms that report a goodwill amortization period, 173 (HI%) choose 40 years 
(and another 77 disclose that they use ;I period ‘not exceeding 40 years’). 
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Summa 
Table 5 
ry of the inventory, depreciation. and goodwill accounting choices of 504 sample firms in 
fiscal 1987. 
_____ 
Choice” Code Number Percent of totaf 
(A) Itmwtory cost jlow assutnptiot~ 
FIFO 2 152 32.5 
AC,‘FIFO 1.5 26 5.4 
AC or Mix 1 97 20.7 
AC,‘LIFO 0.5 15 3.2 
LIFO 0 178 38.0 
Total 468 
_______ 
(B) Depreciation method 
SL 2 369 74.1 
UPiSL 1.5 7 1.4 
UP or Mix 
U P/‘Acc. 
A.5 74 14.9 
0 0.0 
Act. 0 48 9.6 
Total 498 __.__~~__ ~~ _~~ ~~~ _~ ______~_._ 
(C) Goodwill attlortizatiot~ period 
40 years 2 111 48.0 
30-39 years 94 40.7 




“D~fitzition of acron~ws: 
FIFO = first-in-first-out inventory cost flow assumption; 
LIFO = last-in-first-out inventory cost flow assumption; 
AC = average cost method; 
Mix = approximately equal-weighted combination of FIFO and LIFO; 
SL = straight-line depreciation; 
Act. = accelerated depreciation method; 
UP = units-of-production depreciation method; 
Mix = combination of SL and Act. methods. 
6.2. Multivariate tests 
Tables 6 and 7 provide maximum likelihood estimates of ordinal-level logit 
models of the inventory, depreciation, goodwill, and combined deprecia- 
tion-goodwill accounting choices. 24 In each case the dependent variable is 
coded as described above (table 5) so that a positive coefficient indicates an 
24Maddala (1983, pp. 46-49) discusses multinomial models with ordered responses and Cox and 
Snell(1989, ch. 5) describe the ordinal-level logit model that I use here. This type of procedure is also 
used by Zmijewski and Hagerman (19Pl) and is appropriate given the ordinal nature of the 
accounting choice data. I have estimated a number of the equations reported in tables 6 and 7 using 
the ordinal-level probit (or n-probit) model, with very similar results. The ordinal-level logit model is 
implemented using the MIDAS statistical package developed by the Center for Statistical Consult- 
ing and Research at the University of Michigan. This package uses the Newton-Raphson numerical 
procedure to iteratively obtain estimates of the parameters that maximize the likelihood function. 
The. pseudo R-square that I report is from Aldrich and Nelson (1984, p. 57). 
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increase in the probability of choosing a more income-increasing accounting 
alternative. To investigate whether the ios variables help explain accounting 
choice, I report p-values from chi-square tests of the joint null hypothesis that all 
of the coefficients on the ios variables are equal to zero. This test examines 
whether or not the ios variables, as a group, add statistically significant explana- 
tory power to the regression. I also report (in parentheses beneath each esti- 
mated coefficient) the coefficient divided by its asymptotic standard error and 
refer to this ratio as a t-statistic, as well as an overall regression p-value and 
pseudo R-square. 
Because of the large number of independent variables in these regressions (I 
include the traditional size, financial leverage, and compensation variables, 
along with ROA and the four ios proxy variables), there are many possible 
regression specifications. To economize on space, I report on only a few of these 
regressions in tables. However, because the results (i.e., which variables are 
significant and which are not) do not vary greatly between different specifica- 
tions, I am able to do this without distorting the impressions one obtains from 
the data. In addition, in all of the tables I report on the regression that includes 
all of the independent variables. (A more comprehensive set of regression results 
is available from the author.) 
Another issue with respect to model specification is whether there is an 
important simultaneity problem here. If it is the case (as I discuss in section 2) 
that the ios determines firms’ financing, compensation, and accounting choices, 
then the error terms in these regressions will be correlated with some of the 
independent variables, leading to inconsistent estimates of the coefficients. 
However, to estimate a simultaneous equation model requires specifying exactly 
what the relation between the ios and these other variables is, which is difficult 
given the limited state of our knowledge in this area [see Smith and Watts 
(1991)]. 
Table 6 provides the results for the inventory method choice regressions. The 
first equation provides evidence on the size, bonus plan, and debt/equity 
hypotheses that other studies investigate. Consistent with the size hypothesis, 
the coefficient on firm size is reliably negative (t-statistic of - 5.35). However, 
the coefficients on financial leverage and the bonus plan dummy are not 
significant, which is inconsistent with the debt/equity and bonus plan hypothe- 
ses. In the second regression I include the ROA measure along with firm size and 
financial leverage. The coefficient on this variable is reliably negative, which is 
consistent with firms with poor accounting performance making income-in- 
creasing accounting choices, although the negative coefficient may also indicate 
that riskier firms are more likely to choose LIFO. 
Regression 3 in table 6 includes the four ios variables, I am able to reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients on these variables are all zero at the 0.0001 
level. The pseudo R-square for this regression is 6.1 percent. The coefficient on 
the PP&E variable (which increases with assets-in-place) is reliably negative, 
while that on R&D is reliably positive, implying that firms with relatively more 
assets-in-place are more likely to make the income-decreasing accounting 
choice. 
Regression 4 in tab!e 6 includes firm size along with the four ios measures as 
explanatory variables. Including the ios measures does not reduce the statistical 
significance of the size relation, and conversely, the statistical significance of the 
ios variables is not reduced by including firm size in regression. The p-value for 
the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients on the ios variables are all zero is 
significant at the 1% level and the pseudo R-square - of 14.3% - is larger than 
for the regressions that include either just the size variable or just the ios 
variables. It is again the case that the coefficient on the PP&E measure is 
reliably negative while that on R&D is reliably positive. The inferences do not 
change a great deal when I include all of the independent variables in regression 
5. In addition to the size and ios variables, the ROA variable is negative and 
significant, and the pseudo R-square increases to 15.4%. Overall, this evidence 
indicates that the ios variables add explanatory power to the inventory regres- 
sions over and above that provided by firm size and ROA. 
These results suggest that firms with relatively more assets-in-place are more 
likely to choose LIFO, which I have characterized as the income-decreasing 
accounting choice. However, the FIFO vs. LIFO choice also depends on these 
firms’ relative tax positions and on the relative tax benefits of these two 
accounting choices. The relative tax benefits of LIFO depend on the direction 
and rate of change in firms’ input prices, on the variability of firms’ physical 
inventory levels, and on firms’ effective tax rates [e.g., see Lee and Hsieh 
(1985) and Dopuch and Pincus (1988)]. These characteristics are likely to be 
correlated with the ios because: (i) the nature of the firm’s production process is 
likely to affect the variability of inventory levels, and (ii) the firms’ production 
process determines the inputs that are required. The more variable the firm’s 
inventory levels, the higher the probability of forced LIFO liquidations, and SO 
the less attractive is LIFO. Thus, firms with relatively more growth opportuni- 
ties, because they also tend to be more risky, are less likely to select LIFO 
than are other firms. So the tax effects of the firm’s ios generate a prediction 
that firms with more assets-in-place will make the income-decreasing account- 
ing choice. 
To investigate the tax explanation, I include in regressions 6-10 in table 
6 a variable (‘Infl.‘) that measures the direction and rate of price change in these 
firms’ industries. Other things equal, the relative tax benefits of LIFO increase 
with higher (more positive) rates of change in firms’ input prices. I use data from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Producer Price Indices to group these firms’ 
industries into three equal-sized groups: those with high, medium, and low rates 
of price change since 1967 (similar to other studies, these are industry-level 
output price indices). I then define the ‘Infl.’ variable such that firms in the low 
group are coded 2, those in the medium group are coded 1, and those in the high 
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group are coded 0, If the relative tax benefits of LIFO increase with higher rates 
of increase in firms’ input prices (and this helps explain the accounting choice), 
the Infl. variable will be positively related to accounting choice.25 
The evidence indicates that tax-related incentives do help explain firms’ 
inventory method choices. When I include the Ink variable with firm size and 
financial leverage in regression 6, its coefficient is reliably positive (t-statistic of 
3.77), consistent with the prediction that the relative tax benefits of LIFO 
increase with increases in input prices. The coefficient on firm size remains 
reliably negative. Similarly, when I include the Infl. variable along with firm size, 
financial leverage, and the ROA measure in regression 7, the coefficients on firm 
size and ROA are reliably negative and that of InIX reliably positive.26 [Some 
care must be exercised in comparing the results in equations 6-10 with those in 
equations l-5 since there are 357 firms with available data for equations l-5 but 
only 256 firms with available data for equations 6-10 (i.e., there are 101 firms 
without the inflation data).] 
Regressions 9 and 10 in table 6 include the ios variables along with firm size, 
ROA, and the InP.. measure. The ios measures are less significant when all of 
these other variables are included than they were in regressions l-5, suggesting 
that the ios is correlated with tax incentives. (The fact that the ios variables are 
jointly significant at the 0.0002 level in regression 8 indicates that the different 
sample is not the cause of the decline in significance for these variables.) 
Consistent with this, firms with relatively more growth opportunities tend to be 
those for which the tax benefits of LIFO are relatively small: the ‘InIl.’ variable is 
negatively related to the PP&E variable (correlation of - 0.42) and positively 
related to R&D (0.25) and 4 (0.25) so that firms with relatively more assets- 
in-place tend to have experienced larger rates of price increase. 
2JI have also used this variable to perform a check on my coding of LIFO as ‘income-decreasing’ 
and FIFO as ‘income-increasing’. If input prices are falling over some period of time, then FIFO is 
likely to be the income-decreasing accounting choice over that period. Therefore, it may be that my 
coding is incorrect for firms for which the price variable is coded 2 (relatively low rates of price 
increase) and correct for firms for which this variable is coded 0 (relatively high rates of price 
increase). If this is the case, I would expect a different relation between the probability of choosing 
FIFO and the independent variables for different levels of the price variable. However, when I run 
these regressions with the price variable included as an interactive dummy with the other indepen- 
dent variables, none of the interactive terms are significantly different from zero at the 10% level, 
which provides some assurance about the way that I code the inventory choice variable (these 
regressions are not reported in tables), 
261n unreported regressions I also include a measure ot :hese firms’ net operating loss (NOL) 
carryforwards. Firms with relatively large NOL carryforwartis have little incentive to choose LIFO 
to minimize taxes. Consistent with this argument, I find that firms that use FIFO have significantly 
larger NOL carryforwards than firms that use LIFO (the mean and median differences are 
significant at the 5% level). However, the NOL carryforward variable is not significant in a multi- 
variate logit that also includes firm size, ROA, and lnfl. as independent variables. This could be due 
to collinearity: not surprisingly, the NOL carryforward variable is negatively related to ROA 
(correlation of - 0.44). 
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Panel A of table 7 reports ehe results for the depreciation method choice. The 
first regression in panel A characterizes extant results for the size, debt/equity, 
and bonus plan hypotheses. Consistent with these hypotheses, the probability of 
choosing the income-increasing accounting alternative (in this case straight-line 
depreciation) increases as financial leverage increases, is larger when the firm has 
a bonus plan that ties the bonus directly to accounting earnings, and decreases 
as firm size increases. The coefficients on all three variables are reliably different 
from zero, with t-statistics of - 3.72 (firm size), 4.09 (financial leverage), and 3.32 
(bonus plan), and the pseudo R-square for this regression is 9.1 percent. The 
second regression includes the ROA measure along with the size, leverage, and 
bonus play variables. The coefficient on ROA is. insignificant. 
According to the debt/equity hypothesis, financial leverage is important in 
these regressions because it proxies for managers’ incentives to choose income- 
increasing accounting procedures to loosen accounting-based debt covenants. If 
this is the case, there will be a relation between accounting choice and financial 
leverage for firms with accounting-based covenants but not for firms without 
such covenants. To test this, in regression 3 I include a dummy variable coded 
1 if the firm has at least one accounting-based debt covenant and 0 otherwise, 
multiplied by the debt/assets variable, as well as including the debt/assets 
variable alone. The coefficient on this multiplicative dummy variable measures 
how the slope coefficient on debt/assets differs for firms with and without 
accounting-based debt covenants. 
Similar to the results in Press and Weintrop (1990), the leverage variable 
remains significant (t-statistic of 2.46) in this regression while the multiplicative 
dummy variable is insignificant (t = 0.74). Thus, the relation between leverage 
and the depreciation choice does not seem to be due to accounting-based 
covenants, and so may reflect a direct effect of the ios on both accounting choice 
and leverage. (However, this test is probably biased against the multiplicative 
dummy variable because the debt/assets variable includes private as well as 
public debt, while the debt covenant dummy includes only covenants in public 
debt agreements.) 
Regression 4 in panel A of table 7 includes the four ios measures. In this 
regression the null hypothesis that all of the coefficients on the ios proxy 
variables are zero is rejected at the 7% level. However, the only variable that is 
individually significant is asset beta, which has a negative coefficient, implying 
that firms with higher betas are more likely to select income-decreasing account- 
ing procedures. 
When I include the ios measures along with all of the other variables in 
regression 5, they are only jointiy significant at the 10% level, and none of the 
ios variables is individually significant. In contrast, the firm size, financial 
leverage, and bonus plan variables remain statistically significant (their 
t-statistics are largely unaffected by including the ios measures). Moreover, the 
pseudo R-square in this regression is 9.8% which is similar to that for the first 
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regression in the table. The ‘traditional’ variables thus seem to be more impor- 
tant than the ios variables. Because of collinearity in these data, this result does 
not necessarily imply that size, leverage, and the bonus plan are the ‘right’ 
variables and that the ios measures are not. However, the fact that the 
size, leverage, and bonus plan relations that other studies document are robust 
to including the ios variables is important, because it suggests that these 
variables do not ‘matter’ in other studies merely because they are correlated 
with the ios. 
Table 7, panel B provides results for the choice of goodwill amortization 
period. The results in the first regression are similar to, but weaker than, those 
for depreciation: accounting choice is negatively related to firm size and posi- 
tively related to both debt/assets and the existence of a bonus plan. However, 
only the coefficient on debt/assets is reliably different from zero. The different 
results may be because tlic sample of firms here is different to those in the 
depreciation and inventory regressions: only 171 firms are included in panel 
B compared with 369 firms in panel A and 357 firms in table 6. Moreover, the 
171 firms included here tend to be larger than those in the depreciation 
regressions (the difference in medians is significant at the 1% level) because the 
smaller sample firms tend not to report a goodwill choice. When I reestimate the 
depreciation regressions with only the 169 firms that report both goodwill and 
depreciation choices, the size and bonus plan relations become insignificant. 
In regression 2 of panel B I again include the multiplicative dummy variable 
to see whether it is leverage per se, or the existence of accounting-based debt 
covenants in combination with leverage, that better explains accounting choice. 
In this regression the coefficient on the multiplicative dummy variable is positive 
and significant at the 10% level, while the coefficient on debt/assets becomes 
insignificant. Thus, for these firms leverage is only important for firms with 
accounting-based covenants, which is consistent with managers selecting in- 
come-increasing accounting procedures to loosen debt-covenant constraints.27 
Regression 3 includes the four ios measures as explanatory variabies. The ios 
p-value is small (less than O.OOl), indicating that the ios variables together are 
related to the goodwill choice, and the pseudo R-square is 10.2%, larger than for 
either of the first two regressions in panel B. The two variables that are most 
significant are PP&E (t-statistic of - 1.75) and R&D (t-statistic of - 3.45). 
While the negative coefficient on R&D suggests that firms with more growth 
opportunities are more likely to select income-decreasing accounting proce- 
dures, the negative coefficient on gross PP&E suggests the opposite. 
*‘These results are different to those in panel A: the multiplicative dummy variable was not 
significant in the depreciation regressions, while the debt/assets variable was significant. This 
difference is not due to the different samples - when I reestimate the depreciation regressions with 
only the 171 firms included in panel B, the coefficient on the debt/assets variable is still reliably 
positive, while that on the multiplicative dummy is still insignificant. 
D. J. Skinner, hcesmrenr opportunities and uccounting choice 439 
Regressions 4 and 5 in panel B of table 7 include the firm size, financial 
leverage, bonus plan, and ROA measures along with the ios variables. The ios 
variables, as a group, remain significant in the presence of the other variables. 
Moreover, the coefficients on PP&E and R&D are both negative, although only 
the coefficient on R&D is statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient on 
the multiplicative leverage variable is positive and significant at the 5% level, 
while the coefficient on the bonus plan dummy is positive and signi5cant at the 
10% level. The results for goodwill are therefore consistent with the debt/equity 
and bonus plan hypotheses, but also indicate that the ios variables are important. 
Finally, table 7, panel C reports results for regressions that combine these 
firms’ depreciation and goodwill choices in a single dependent variable, similar 
to Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981). 28 For these regressions I categorize the 
accounting choices of these firms into five different strategies, from most in- 
come-increasing (where the firm selects the most income-increasing alternative 
for both depreciation and goodwill) to most income-decreasing (where the firm 
selects the most income-decreasing alternative for both choices), and use these 
strategies as the dependent variable. 29 As with the Zmijewski-Hagerman tests, 
this should provide a more powerful test than considering either of these choices 
in isolation. 
The evidence in the first two regressions in panel C of table 7 is again 
consistent with the traditional contracting explanations for accounting choice. 
The coefficients on the size, financial leverage, and the bonus plan dummy 
variables are all reliably different from zero, with the size variable negatively 
related to accounting choice and the debt/assets and bonus plan dummy 
variables both positively related to accounting choice. Regression 3 includes 
these variables along with the multiplicative debt covenant variable. The coeffi- 
cient on this variable is positive and marginally significant (t = 1.53), supporting 
the interpretation that leverage is important because it proxies for the existence 
of accounting-based debt covenants (again, the coefficient on this variable may 
be downward biased because the debt covenant dummy systematically excludes 
covenants from private debt agreements). This regression has a pseudo R-square 
of 15.4%. 
Regression 3 in panel C includes the four ios variables. These variables are 
jointly significant at the 1% level, and the regression R-square is 10%. The 
“1 do not include the inventory choice because, as noted above, this choice depends on tax as well 
as contracting considerations, and so seems to be a different decision from the other two accounting 
choices. 
29Since the goodwill choice has only three levels (income-increasing, intermediate, and income- 
decreasing), I also collapse the depreciation choice into three levels. Since there are three levels for 
each of two choices, there are nine possible permutations and five unique strategies. Of the 229 firms 
that report both choices, 85 (37%) select strategy 5 (the most income-increasing strategy), 85 (37%) 
select strategy 4,39 (17%) select strategy 3, 14 (6%) select strategy 2, and 6 (3%) select strategy 1 (the 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































442 D.J. Skinner, Investment opportunities and accounting choice 
coefficients on R&D and beta are negative and reliably different from zero, 
again suggesting that firms with more assets-in-place (fewer growth opportuni- 
ties) are more likely to make the income-increasing accounting choice. In 
regression 4 I include the ROA variable along with the ios variables. Similar to 
the results in panels A and B, the ROA variable is not significant, and its 
inclusion does not affect the significance of the ios variables. 
When I include all of the variables in regression 5, the pseudo R-square 
increases to 19.2% but only two of the coefficients are individually significant: 
the coefficient on the bonus plan dummy is reliably positive and the coefficient 
on R&D is reliably negative. Of the other variables, the one that is closest to 
being significant at the 5% level is that on the multiplicative debt/assets 
*covenants variable. The reduction in the individual significance of the other 
variables probably reflects the collinearity that exists between these variables. 
Overall, the evidence in table 7 suggests that the ‘traditional’ explanations are 
important, even after controlling for the effect of the ios. Nevertheless, the ios 
variables do help explain these choices, both by themselves and in combination 
with the traditional variables. The results in table 7 also suggest that firms with 
more assets-in-place are more likely to choose income-increasing accounting 
procedures, which is opposite to the result for the inventory choice. 
7. Discussion and summary 
This study provides evidence on the relation between firms’ investment 
opportunities, the nature of their debt and compensation contracts, and their 
financial leverage, size, firm performance, and accounting procedures. There are 
three principal empirical results. 
First, larger firms are more likely to select income-decreasing depreciation 
and inventory procedures, more highly-levered firms are more likely to select 
income-increasing depreciation and goodwill procedures, and firms with bonus 
plans are more likely to select income-increasing depreciation and goodwill 
procedures, than are other firms. These results confirm extant results in the 
literature, that is, they are consistent with the size, debt/equity, and bonus plan 
hypotheses. Importantly, the evidence indicates that these relations are robust 
to including measures of the ios and/or accounting performance (ROA) in 
accounting choice regressions. 
Second, I document that the ios affects the nature of firm contracts: firms with 
more assets-in-place are more likely to have accounting-based debt covenants in 
their public debt agreements and are more likely to use bonus plans that tie the 
bonus directly to accounting earnings. As a result, managers of firms with more 
assets-in-place have larger incentives, given the nature of their firms’ contracts, 
to select income-increasing accounting procedures. Therefore, the ios affects 
accounting choice indirectly through its effect on the nature of firm contracts. 
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Third, the ios variables are correlated with all three of the accounting 
procedures that I examine. Moreover, except in the case of depreciation, the ios 
variables provide incremental explanatory power in regressions that also include 
firm size, financial leverage, and the bonus plan dummy as independent vari- 
ables. Thus, the evidence indicates that there is an association between the ios 
and accounting procedure choice, even after controlling for managers’ contrac- 
tual incentives to select particular accounting procedures. 
More specifically, firms with larger ratios of assets-in-place to value are more 
likely to make ‘income-increasing’ depreciation and goodwill choices than other 
firms. However, while the ios proxy variables are also related to these firms’ 
inventory accounting choices, the directional association is opposite that for the 
depreciation and goodwill choices: firms with larger ratios of assets-in-place to 
value are more likely to make the ‘income-decreasing’ accounting choice (LIFO) 
than are other firms. One plausible explanation for this result is that firms’ 
inventory method choices are also affected by the relative tax costs of LIFO vs. 
FIFO, and that the relative tax costs of FIFO are smaller for firms with 
relatively more growth opportunities. 
Overall, the evidence in this paper increases our understanding of current 
accounting practice in several ways. First, while there has been speculation in 
the literature about the effect of the ios on accounting choice, this study is the 
first to document this relation in a general way for a large, randomly-chosen, 
sample of firms. Importantly, the evidence suggests that previous evidence on 
the size, debt/equity, and bonus plan hypotheses cannot be explained by the fact 
that those studies exclude the ios, which is a potentially important correlated 
omitted variable. Second, this study documents that the ios systematically 
affects the nature of firm contracts, and thus affects managers’ contractual 
incentives to select particular accounting procedures. Finally, the evidence 
provides some limited support for the view that the ios affects accounting choice 
directly, which is expected if the ios affects which accounting procedures are 
optimal ex ante. 
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